Compromised build, 2020
A signed update, with the attacker inside.
- What it cost
- It became one of the most studied breaches in history and fed into a May 2021 US executive order on improving cybersecurity, including software supply chain security.
- The lesson
- A signature proves who shipped the update, not that their build was clean. Verification only helps if the build itself is protected too.
Read the full story and sources
In 2020 attackers broke into SolarWinds' build system and inserted malicious code into updates of its Orion network-monitoring software. The updates were digitally signed by SolarWinds and went out to about 18,000 customers between March and June 2020. A much smaller number, including US government agencies and large companies, were then chosen for follow-up attacks. Security firm FireEye uncovered it in December 2020 after being affected itself.
It became one of the most studied breaches in history and fed into a May 2021 US executive order on improving cybersecurity, including software supply chain security.
Sources: SolarWinds statements, US CISA, Mandiant (FireEye).